Ecological engineering is one of the important starting points and implementation ways to achieve the goals of sustainable development and the goal of building a beautiful China. Ecological engineering plays an important role in ecosystem restoration, ecological function and quality improvement, promoting regional development and improving human well-being. The quality of ecological projects is the touchstone to test whether the implementation results of ecological projects meet the expected goals. It has important guiding significance for improving the management methods of relevant entities related to the quality of ecological projects and completing the implementation goals of ecological projects with high quality. This article divides the three parties related to ecological engineering into government regulatory departments, ecological engineering enterprises and third-party testing agencies, constructs a theoretical analysis framework of ecological engineering quality supervision mechanism, establishes a three-party asymmetric dynamic evolution game model, and analyzes the evolution of strategic choices of each participant Analyze and simulate the stability and evolution path to explore the role of each element and the game evolution rules of each participant in the operation of the ecological engineering quality supervision mechanism. The analysis results show that: (1) Clarify the decision-making mechanism of ecological engineering quality supervision subjects, ensure that the ecological engineering quality supervision mechanism meets the principles of participation constraints and compatibility of rewards and punishments, and must comprehensively consider the maximization of personal benefits and comprehensive benefits of each participant in ecological engineering quality supervision. maximization problem. (2) The reward and punishment system forms an endogenous collective drive for all participants, has a positive catalytic effect on the quality supervision of ecological projects, can effectively consolidate the responsibilities of each participant, promote the high-quality implementation of ecological projects, and enhance the ecological benefits of ecological projects. (3) Expected benefits and costs are key economic factors that determine the behavioral decisions of all participants. Government regulatory authorities focus on prioritizing ecological benefits, social benefits and management risk control. Ecological engineering companies and third-party testing agencies usually prioritize your own economic interests. (4) Interactive coupling occurs between the behavioral decisions of various participants in ecological engineering quality supervision, and multi-factor coupling drives the effect; the behavioral strategies of each participant are affected by changes in the strategic choices of other participants. This research can provide a certain theoretical basis for the high-quality implementation of ecological engineering, ensuring the realization of the expected goals of ecological engineering, and related policy research on the quality assurance system of ecological engineering.